Fortifying the house and arming yourself
Flagged as theatre
The measure with zero evidence in favour and one against: the only formal model that exists concludes that excessive fortification can provoke the attack rather than prevent it, and that what decides the outcome is legitimacy and reciprocity, not walls.
- Level
- Personal
- Cost
- High cost
- Effort
- Ongoing
- Evidence
- Speculative
What it does not solve
Everything. It intervenes in none of the six scenarios, and carries a cost rarely counted: the time and disposition spent fortifying are the same that would build the neighbour network that does predict who recovers. It helps against ordinary crime, which is a real problem and not what this site is about.
It works if the problem is ordinary crime, which is real, everyday and not what this site is about.
It does not work if the scenario is any of the six here. We looked for evidence in favour and found none, neither for AI risks nor for global catastrophe. What does exist is a formal model that concludes the opposite: Laurent Gauthier, in Risk Analysis (December 2025), models elite fortification as self-insurance, introduces an index of environmental hostility and shows that excessive investment in defence can provoke the attack. His closing line puts it plainly: maximum fortification may not be optimal compared with a degree of cooperation, redistribution and efforts to reduce perceived inequality [445]Compounds and Raiders: A Strategic Model of Self-Protection in the End TimesView source ↗verified through Crossref.
Evidence. Zero in favour, one against. And there is a convergence worth underlining because it comes from completely different methods: Nick Beckstead, assessing private refuges, finds that their only potentially unique contribution would be isolation and coordination, not defensive capability [124]How much could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe?View source ↗archived copy only; and the empirical evidence from real disasters points to social ties, not walls, as the predictor of who recovers [47]Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster RecoveryView source ↗.
Cost. High, and with a negative cost that almost never gets counted: a defensive posture competes for time and disposition with local reciprocity, which is the best-evidenced measure on this list. Preparing the fortification and getting to know your neighbours are not neutral towards each other.
What it does NOT solve. Everything.
Does not work if…
- Catastrophe through misuse · Does not work
Neither a pathogen nor a network intrusion negotiates with a fence.
- Gradual disempowerment · Backfires
A defensive posture competes for time and disposition with local reciprocity, which is the best-evidenced personal measure on this list.
- The intelligence curse · Backfires
- Power grab by a small group · Does not work
- Rapid loss of control · Does not work
See in the protection matrix →Report a mistake in this entry →
Sources
- [445] Compounds and Raiders: A Strategic Model of Self-Protection in the End Times · Gauthier, Laurent 2025 verified through Crossref
- [124] How much could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe? · Future of Humanity Institute 2015 archived copy only
- [47] Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-Disaster Recovery · University of Chicago Press 2012