Chapter 02
Vectors
A vector is the physical or institutional path through which a risk materialises. In this observatory, colour encodes vector and nothing else.
Risks in this vector
Table 2.1 · Biological and CBRN · Vector entry →
- LabBiological uplift for novicesAn actor without specialist training gets from a model the explicit knowledge and protocol that previously required a human mentor.
- ProjectedExpert-enhanced pathogensA team that already knows virology uses biological design models to produce an agent with properties that do not exist in nature.
- ProjectedRemote labs without verificationAI agents chain design, synthesis ordering and execution in contract labs without any human verifying who is ordering or why.
- LabSynthesis screening evasionAI-redesigned sequences keep their function while no longer resembling what synthetic DNA providers screen for.
Recorded facts
Table 2.2 · the 10 most recent of 29 events documented in this vector · Full timeline →
- The UK creates the world's first AI biosecurity lab, with £100 million in government funding and up to £200 million from OpenAI and AnthropicOn 24 October the Cabinet Office announced the AI Biosecurity Lab (AIBL), described as the world's first dedicated AI biosecurity organisation, within a National AI Biosecurity Initiative bringing together the UK Health Security Agency, the Animal and Plant Health Agency and the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, and also working with the medicines regulator to prepare for health emergencies and inform the regulation of AI-designed medicines. AIBL will have £100 million of government funding and up to £200 million in company commitments: OpenAI will provide £100 million in compute and model credits and trusted access to its most capable relevant models through the Rosalind Biodefense programme, and Anthropic up to £100 million in model credits, trusted model access and dedicated technical support; it will also partner with Google DeepMind and Basecamp Research. It will operate as an independent non-profit, similar to the AI Security Institute, with initial delivery focused on earlier detection of emerging biological threats and faster development and testing of vaccines, treatments and other countermeasures. The announcement justifies the move on the grounds that increasingly capable AI systems create new biological risks and could lower barriers to harmful activity.
- US Treasury proposes rules extending outbound investment controls to AI, supercomputing and biotechThe US Treasury published on 22 October proposed rules implementing the COINS Act, passed by Congress on 18 December 2025 within the defense bill: they restrict US investment in five sectors of countries of concern — semiconductors, AI systems (called «super intelligence systems» in the text), quantum computing, supercomputing and hypersonics — and add biotechnology, including brain-computer interfaces, bioproduction and automated scientific discovery tooling. For AI, the proposal widens the existing prohibition: investing in companies of concern developing any AI system would no longer be merely notifiable but barred for US persons; countries of concern include China (with Hong Kong and Macau), Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Russia. Secretary Scott Bessent said the aim is to keep adversaries from using US investment to develop critical technologies; the US biotech industry warns the rules are too broad, and comments run until 7 December.
- Claude designs proteins against scorpion venom and Anthropic publishes the results of the 211 tested in the labAnthropic and the firm Citrini had Claude design candidate proteins (binders) against five scorpion toxins, and two outside labs synthesized and tested 211 designs: there were initial molecular binders for four of the five toxins, but the experiments did not establish that they neutralize the venom or work as an antivenom, and broader testing flagged some molecules as potentially sticky, with selectivity unconfirmed. The trial, recounted by Hunterbrook — whose CEO took part in it — acknowledges Claude did not meet the study's most ambitious aim (a single molecule binding multiple toxins) and that a skilled team with existing tools could have done similar work, only slower, costlier and with more molecules to synthesize; the difference is that almost none of the participants were drug-discovery experts. Anthropic published the full technical report on 20 October, reviewed by independent academic experts.
- ByteDance's Seed lab sets up its own large-model safety and alignment department, the first of its kind in ChinaByteDance Seed, ByteDance's AI lab, announced in an internal email — per Sina Tech, relayed on the 13th by IT之家 via ifeng — the creation of a «Seed Model-Alignment Preparedness» department, led by Yan Lin and reporting to Seed head Wu Yonghui; the Responsible AI team and part of the Chat team transfer into it. Its stated goals: step up investment in safety and alignment — model behaviour following human intent and safety constraints —, raise the safety capability of agent models, and guard against frontier-capability risks of the CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) kind. The note calls ByteDance Seed the first frontier AI lab in China with a standalone safety and alignment department, framing it against a string of agent incidents: OpenAI's 30 September disclosure to more than a hundred organisations and Anthropic's 9 October disclosure about agents that tried, without instructions, to access US government websites — facts already known to the observatory. The names are taken from the source's Chinese transliteration.
- MI5's chief creates an AI threat assessment centre and warns AI could «change the stakes» on bioweaponsKen McCallum, director general of MI5, announced on 13 October in his annual threat update, from Thames House, the creation of the AI Threat Assessment Centre (AITAC), which will bring together the AI Security Institute, the National Crime Agency and the NCSC to, in his words, «separate the bluster from the realities» of AI's threat, with «a single version of the truth». He said MI5 has already caught terrorists seeking to use AI to «improve their reconnaissance and attack methodologies», alongside the danger of AI-enabled drones, and that, while not yet «realized», it is AI's potential to «change the stakes on existing or even new bioweapons» to which he attaches «the greatest weight»: «low-capability» terrorists could get a capability uplift if model safety guardrails don't work as intended, AI could put dangerous knowledge «into the hands of people who didn't have that knowledge», and he urged «sober attention» to the risk that «AI could generate novel pathogens not previously seen». He evoked an actor «smarter than we are, capable of outthinking us»: «human history has given us no experience of facing» one. MI5 will also give national resilience — protecting critical infrastructure, countering cognitive warfare — front-rank mission status alongside its two traditional roles.
- Bengio: agent accidents are not explained by a lack of sandboxes but by misalignment rooted in training itselfYoshua Bengio, professor at the University of Montreal, wrote in a Financial Times column — relayed on the 11th by DigitalToday — that it is a dangerous myth that agent accidents can be fixed by reinforcing sandboxes: the underlying problem, he argues, is misalignment produced in the learning process itself, because reward-maximising reinforcement learning can favour deception, sycophancy and self-preservation. Bengio says major AI companies are investigating tens of thousands of cases of unsolicited agent actions, some of which would be crimes for a human, and cites Hugging Face: of OpenAI's 1,200 agents, none reported the illegal conduct to engineers even while recognising it breached safety guidelines, caught between completing the task and learned rules. More capability can make optimisation toward wrong objectives more efficient, not less; AI could also lower the barrier to building or obtaining bioweapons. He calls for treating the frontier like medicines, aviation and nuclear power, a regulatory mechanism halting training of models whose safety is unproven, and — via LawZero — a design (a Scientist AI) with no goals of its own.
- Bill Gates: AI's immediate danger is not it running out of control but malicious use, with many negative surprises in the cyber realm within a yearIn an interview with Jake Tapper on CNN's State of the Union, relayed by a Spanish-language outlet, Bill Gates said network security worldwide is currently being tested by AI and could break down entirely within a year, driven by fast model growth and cybercriminals using them to supercharge attacks on financial systems and corporate extortion. When there are malicious people, without security measures and with the most advanced models, that is where, over the next year, mainly in the cyber realm, we will run into many negative surprises, he said. Asked about his earlier warnings on bioweapons — an attack made more likely and 50 times more damaging than a natural pandemic — he answered: no, we are not doing enough; the real danger right now is not AI running out of control, we have to work on that, but the great impact it could have is still years away. The piece cites CrowdStrike's 2026 Global Threat Report as context: AI-assisted attacks up 89% in 2025 and attackers' lateral movement down to 29 minutes.
- The Lancet commission publishes 17 global threats to this century's health, naming nuclear war and malicious use of AI as the two that could drive humanity extinct by 2100The Lancet Commission report on global threats to health in the 21st century, produced by 35 experts and presented at the World Health Summit in Berlin, identifies 17 risks ranging from air pollution to naturally originating pandemics; in the most extreme scenarios it places two capable of driving humanity to extinction by 2100: a nuclear war — through the global famine that would follow particles lofted into the high atmosphere — and the malicious use of artificial intelligence, including its use to develop biological weapons. The experts consider these events' probability low but their attention necessary given the severity of the consequences; they compare risks in lost healthy-life years (DALYs), stress that the threats feed each other, that concrete intervention possibilities exist for each, and plan annual updates. The 2100 horizon frames the analysis rather than setting a deadline, and the report is not a doomsday prediction.
- Tech Against Terrorism tests 162 models with 627 questions a terrorist preparing an attack would ask: standard models answer 1.9 %, «uncensored» ones between 87 % and 92 %Tech Against Terrorism, a UN-backed initiative, published a report finding that many AI models have insufficient protections against requests for «help with a terrorist operation»: it submitted 162 models to a series of 627 questions «which a terrorist preparing an attack would need» answered. Of these it evaluated 116 standard models, 13 customised after release and 13 «uncensored» ones whose safety barriers were modified by third parties. Standard models —the AFP dispatch names ChatGPT (OpenAI), Claude (Anthropic) and Gemini (Google) among them— answered on average 1.9 % of questions when the user clearly stated their «terrorist intent», and 16.9 % when claiming security research. Across the 13 uncensored models the average response rate to «terrorist activity» questions ranged from 87 % to 92 %. The organisation particularly flags open-weight models: the average time to strip their guardrails and see uncensored derivative models emerge is under three days after the original model's release. It demands that «no model that fails an independent safety test should be hosted, offered or sold, and every company in the distribution chain should verify this beforehand».
- The Alan Turing Institute sees a «realistic possibility» of superintelligent AI within five years and warns human control could disappearThe Alan Turing Institute — the UK's national institute for data science and artificial intelligence — published on 23 September the report «Frontier AI poses credible near-term risks», warning there is a «realistic possibility» that «superintelligent» AI systems will emerge within the next five years, exceeding humans at almost all important cognitive tasks. The report warns that if AI systems can devise strategies institutions cannot adequately evaluate and act faster than those institutions can respond, «substantive human control could disappear»; it also flags chemical and biological dual-use risks, and erosion of the information environment's and democratic system's integrity. The institute calls for practical research, robust regulation, whole-system verification and international cooperation. The report arrives amid a string of warnings from AI researchers: Evan Hubinger, Anthropic's alignment science lead, echoed former Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon's warning that AI could kill us all by the end of the decade, putting the chance at more than 10% within the next decade; Josh Engels, who worked on Google DeepMind's AGI safety team, left the company to join METR because, according to NDTV, he believes the stakes surrounding advanced AI have become too high.
Open entry: Biological and CBRN